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Abstract 
The paper wants to understand the assimilation pattern of foreign migrants in Italy. Three novelties 
characterize this study. First, the research compares the wage assimilation of international migrants 
with both internal migrants and local natives in Italy, a country with substantial internal and 
international migration. This comparison, never exploited before, provides indirect evidence for the 
role played by language and knowledge of social capital in the assimilation of foreign migrants 
relative to both natives and internal migrants. Second, we inquired into the possible causes of under-
assimilation by controlling for the date of entry and migrant sector concentration. Third, we model 
new corrections of the selection bias due to return migration. The correction for the selection bias is 
introduced in the wage equation through a duration extension of the traditional Heckman correction 
term and alternatively through a hazard rate correction. The empirical test uses the Italian 
administrative dataset on dependent employment (WHIP), to estimate a fixed effect model for the 
weekly wages of males aged 18-45 with controls for selection in return migration and unobserved 
heterogeneity. The three groups of workers start their careers at the same wage level. But, as 
experience increases, the wage profiles of foreign nationals and natives, both internal migrants and 
locals, diverges which seems to hint at the importance of language and social capital. However, sector-
by-sector analysis shows that in “migrant intense sectors” internal migrants and locals have the same 
wage profile as foreign workers. Positive selection in returns reinforces the view that the best leave 
because they have few career options. Thus under assimilation is caused more by community and job 
segregation than by a lack of language and social capital: alternatively it is the result of their 
interrelations. 
Keywords 
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JEL code: J31, J61, C23 
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Introduction* 
The migration debate is intertwined with the debate on an aging European society, something which is 
particularly dramatic in Italy. This is a reminder of the importance of permanent migration flows and 
of their integration in host countries. Social cohesion
1
 is the challenge that societies like Italy face and 
economic integration is one of the pillars on which integration is based. 
The policy debate takes two different turns: on the one hand, improving the chances of social and 
economic integration at the migration policy level by selecting only those foreign nationals who have 
a high chance of integration, namely the highly skilled or migrants from communities with a better 
rate of socio-economic integration; and, on the other hand, putting in place an effective set of 
integration policies which can be implemented after arrival and which favour language and cultural 
knowledge and, therefore, assimilation. 
In this paper we contribute to this debate by analysing the economic integration of foreign migrants 
in Italy. Italy is, of course, a country of recent immigration, but a country which also has a long 
experience of international and internal mobility
2
.  
Foreign migrants started to choose Italy as a destination country at the end of the 1970s, when, 
after the first oil shock, Northern European countries adopted restrictive immigration policies and it 
became increasingly difficult to enter their labour markets. The inflows to Italy, and, in general, to 
Southern European countries, thereafter, became increasingly important for migrants. Indeed, in 2010 
migrants went to make up 8% of the population in Italy, 7.4% in Greece, 6.3% in Portugal and 14.5% 
in Spain (OECD, 2012). The political debate in Italy initially focused on the entrance of foreign 
nationals.
3
 But the rapid aging of Italian society (31% of the total population is more than 65 years 
old, one of the highest shares in Europe) and its need for a permanent population to offset shrinkage 
has moved the debate on. Talk is now of economic and social integration and the most appropriate 
policies to favour these kinds of integration.  
This study compares foreign migrants not only with native local workers (who work in their birth 
area), but also with native migrants (who are born in a different region). In so doing it provides new 
insights into foreign assimilation. The comparison, not yet exploited in Italy or, indeed, in any other 
country known to us, makes for interesting reading. After all, native immigrants, unlike foreign 
immigrants, are supposed to know the language of the destination country: the empirical literature has 
shown language to be crucial in assimilation
4
. Moreover, native immigrants should also share some of 
the social rules that apply in the destination countries, so that they should not be disadvantaged 
relative to national local workers: at the very least, they should be less disadvantaged than foreign 
migrants
5
.  
                                                     
*
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1
 See Ruedin and D’Amato 2012. 
2
 For a survey see Del Boca and Venturini 2005. 
3
 The available empirical research shows that in general foreign nationals do not compete with natives in the Italian labour 
market (Gavosto et al. 1999, Venturini and Villosio 2006). If there is competition it is between Southern internal 
migrants and foreign migrants (Brucker, Fachin, Venturini, 2010). 
4
 For instance, Dustmann and Van Soest, 2002, Chiswick and Miller, 2012 
5
 An important role is sometimes played by the community already residing in the destination country transferring 
knowledge and helping migrants both native and foreign to find a better job. We also wonder if the network of native 
immigrants is more efficient than their foreign equivalents. The literature on the role of networks in favoring the job 
match of workers is very large, see for instance Simon and Warner 1992, 10(3), Granovetter 1974 and the literature on 
the role of the network in determining the migration and the assimilation of migrants is even larger. In the empirical 
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However, anecdotal evidence on Italian native migrants, as found in novels, newspaper articles, 
films and sociological research (for instance Fofi 1975 and Ascolani et al. 1974), presents a very 
different scenario. In the 1960s and the 1970s southern native migrants in North Italy especially had 
great difficulties in being understood because they spoke dialects that were significantly different from 
Italian. The newspapers spoke of an invasion from the “South” and the word meridionale 
(“southerner”) essentially came to mean “immigrant”: the women were even called mussulmane 
(Muslims) because of their different behaviour. Moreover, they came from rural backgrounds and yet 
they found themselves in urban settings
6
. As a result they were discriminated against in their everyday 
lives, especially when renting accommodation. In a very real sense they were foreigners: certainly they 
were perceived as such. Resentment against internal mobility led to a local party (MAP Movement for 
the regional autonomy of Piedmont) which asked for a limitation on internal migration: there was 
concern about competition in the labour market, and regional type of preferences similar to the EU 
preferences close, and a limitation on welfare access. The electorate complained about taxes paid to 
the welfare state used by migrants who tended to have many children and who were poorer than the 
local population: many voted for MAP (Capussotti 2012). The MAP program sounds very similar to 
the current program of Lega Nord which has similar objectives in its electorate program. In addition 
Southern migrants felt “abroad” in the North including their encounters with the kind of bureaucratic 
tangles often experienced by migrants. For example, they were asked to get a residence permit before 
searching for a job. but they could only get a residency permit if they had a job. As Pugliese (2010) 
stresses they never properly integrated and they almost always had wages and positions below their 
ability
7
. 
Employers when hiring do not know a worker’s individual productivity. However, there can be no 
question that they have greater difficulties evaluating immigrants, both native and foreign. The result 
is that native immigrants and foreign nationals may have similar initial wage profiles. 
Our aim is, therefore, to test whether foreign migrants (born abroad and working in the region) 
perform differently from local workers (born and working in the same area), and native migrants 
(born in an area different from the working one). In looking into this problem we hope to give a better 
understanding of the role of language and social norms in economic assimilation. 
Assimilation also depends on the characteristics of those foreign immigrants who remain in the 
destination country. The decision to return home is a function of the duration of stay in the destination 
country. Thus, in order to model the selection of foreign immigrants that leave the destination country, 
we have first extended the well-known static Heckman approach to deal with the combination of 
selection and duration. We have also used the proportional Hazard rate function,
8
 which is an 
alternative specification of a selection term which also accounts for duration effects. 
In addition, we tried to get to the bottom of the reason for under-assimilation by taking into 
account: the community effect which might constrain assimilation; labour market trends at the time of 
arrival, which might affect the possibility of finding more promising jobs; and, finally, the 
employment sector which might lead to segmentation.  
The Italian administrative dataset uses empirical tests on dependent employment (WHIP). It 
estimates a fixed effect model for the log weekly wage of males aged 18-45 with controls for selection 
in return migration and unobserved heterogeneity from 1985 to 2003. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
version we will employ a variable on the dimension of the community, but we cannot control for the tenure of members, 
nor for any active role played. It is thus more similar to a congestion variable than to a network one. 
6
 They allegedly grew tomatoes, basil and parsley in their bath tubs. 
7
 Pugliese p.56. 
8
 Similarly Kirdar (2008) adopts a hazard rate function to inquire into the effect of saving in the decision of return. 
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The three groups of workers start their careers at a similar wage level. However, as experience 
increases, the wage profiles of foreign nationals and natives, both immigrants and locals, diverge. This 
result is also driven by positive selection in the returns. Put in other terms foreign workers with lower 
wages are the most likely to stay in Italy.  
Analysis by similar time of entrance provides analogous results with a strong under-assimilation of 
migrants which does not depend on the jobs available in the labour market at the time of entrance. 
Instead, analysis by Migrant Intense Sectors shows a similar pattern for the three groups, providing 
evidence in favour of a structural interpretation of the results. Foreign migrants do not assimilate 
because they are employed in sectors which do not provide career options. We argue that there is 
segmentation of the labour market: 73% of foreign nationals are employed in 47 out of 168 total 
sectors, while only 40% of natives are to be found in these sectors. In these sectors the average foreign 
share is 22.5% – with a very large dispersion, some sectors having a foreign share of over 50% – while 
the foreign share in the remaining sectors is a paltry 5.4%.  
The present paper is divided into 6 sections: (i) a brief history of migration to Italy; (ii) a brief 
review of the assimilation literature; (iii) return migration in the assimilation model; (iv) a description 
of the dataset and of the variables used; and (v) a section of results with a part regarding return 
migration, one concerning aggregate assimilation and one on controls for the time of entrance and for 
the sector of entrance. A concluding section (vi) closes the paper. 
1. Brief historical summary 
During the 1980s Italy was first exposed to immigration from neighbouring areas (North Africa) and 
from Asia (mainly Filipinos) and Latin America. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, inflows also began 
from Eastern Europe. Initially, migrants came from nearby Albania. But they later arrived from further 
away, from Romania and Moldova, attracted by the similarity of Italian to their native languages. They 
came too from as far away as Ukraine (See Figure 1). In many cases, they entered the country illegally 
and their regular position is the result of the many amnesties granted by the Italian government. To 
become legal, migrants need a regular job offer, and to obtain one, they usually have to work illegally 
for at least a couple of years. The number of regular permits decided each year by the government has 
always been insufficient in satisfying the number of immigrants who come to Italy. It has also been 
insufficient in satisfying the national demand for them. Illegal entry was used as a first step towards 
legalization in the destination country. The repetition of amnesties – a policy shared with the other 
Southern European countries – has created the expectation of further sanatoria. It has also made it 
more difficult to control migration (on this see Venturini 2004: ch.5). The strong reaction of the native 
population against larger legal inflows has led to the belief that it is impossible to control the country’s 
borders. The information set out in Figure 1 is derived from residence permits, which only cover legal 
foreign nationals. Estimates on illegal ones
9
 stood at about half a million undocumented immigrants in 
2010, equal to 12% of the resident foreign population. This share has changed a great deal over time 
(from 10 to 40% of the legal total). This variation depends, to a very great extent, on whether the 
estimate is taken after or before an amnesty
10
.  
According to the most recent data on foreign residents (2012, ISTAT) 61.6% of foreign residents 
were located in the North while only 25% in the Centre and only 13% in the South and the Islands. In 
general they had unskilled jobs, though in a few cases they had higher qualifications. Men usually 
worked in construction, in agriculture and in manufacturing, while women worked in family services 
and services in general. A few women also worked in industry (2011, ISTAT).  
                                                     
9
 Produced by ISMU with the “Centre Sampling Technique” (Baio, Blangiardo et al. 2011 See www.ismu.org). 
10
 ISMU Report 2012 
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While foreign migration is a relatively recent phenomenon, Italy has a long tradition of 
international emigration: first overseas to the Americas, then to Northern Europe. There has also been, 
however, extensive internal migration from the less developed areas of the South, but also of the North 
East, to the richer areas of the North West. Emigration from the South to the Northern regions once 
represented 33% of Southern employment. With the Second World War, international emigration 
ceased, and it continued after the War in Europe and in Italy, but at a slower pace than before the war. 
Indeed, migration between Northern and Southern Italy was very important for its dimension and 
duration and declined steadily only from the 1970s onwards despite a substantial increase in the 
unemployment differential.  
Drawing on social security data, Figure 2 presents the last thirty years of internal migration by 
natives
11
: the North West is by far the main destination area. Most emigration is from the Southern 
regions to all possible destinations, but most notably to the North West and Centre. A negligible 
amount of people moved from the North West to the South. Finally, flows from the Centre have been 
insignificant throughout the period. After a period of decline, in the second half of the 1990s inflows 
acquired new strength, especially to the North East. 
Faini et al. (1997), using a special edition of the quarterly Labour Force Survey, show that the fall 
in mobility levels in Southern Italy may have been driven by a combination of several factors: 
demographics; high mobility costs; and inefficiencies in the job matching process sufficiently strong 
to offset the influence of rising unemployment differentials. Attanasio and Padoa Schioppa (1991) also 
point out the role of mismatches in the labour market. These mismatches may explain low mobility 
and high unemployment in the South. Cannari et al. (2000) show that the North-South housing price 
differential has become a notable factor in the falling off in geographical mobility. Since 1995, 
however, interregional mobility has increased again. Using information on change of residency 
reported at local registers, Piras (2005) shows that the propensity to emigrate increases with education 
level, and that there is evidence of a brain drain from the Italian South.
12
 
Figure 2 shows a general increase in foreign immigration in all the destination areas. But there is 
also a decline in migration from the South, with the exception of the North East. Even there, however, 
there are more foreign than internal migrants, suggesting competition between the two groups of 
workers (Brücker et al. 2009). 
2. Assimilation literature: some recalls 
The economic literature on the assimilation of immigrants began with the pioneering work of 
Chiswick (1978) and the seminal contributions by Borjas (1985) and La Londe and Topel (1992): all 
these were based on the US Census. The over-assimilation initially found (Chiswick 1978, using a 
single census) was attributed to positive self-selection by migrant workers: that is, they were more 
entrepreneurial, more talented and less risk averse. The under-assimilation of immigrants found by 
Borjas (1985) in the US was attributed to the lower quality of the most recent cohorts.  
The differing quality of cohorts at the time of immigration is due to various factors: changes in 
immigration policy, so that individuals with different characteristics are selected; different economic 
conditions in the destination country which alter the nationality mix of immigrants and thus gives rise 
to changes in their productivity; and changes in the composition of the cohorts due to non-casual 
repatriation. The same result of under-assimilation was reported by La Londe and Topel (1992), but it 
                                                     
11
 Information on internal migration can also be derived from the ISTAT Local registers which report the change of 
residency. However, these are only flow data. 
12
 This last source reports the number of both workers and family members who change their residency, but it has no labour 
information. Hence it is not suited for any assimilation study. We overcome this problem by using the WHIP – Work 
Histories Italian Panel – which enables us to discriminate between workers on the basis of their place of birth. 
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was attributed to less attractive economic conditions in the destination country at the time of arrival, 
which offered few career prospects to migrants. This debate is conditioned by the rich set of 
information available from the US Census, which, however, raises a series of methodological 
problems more easily solved by longitudinal data. The study on true longitudinal data conducted by 
Lubotsky (2007), however, offers a similar conclusion: immigrant wages increase by about 10-15% in 
the first 20 years in the US, but not enough to offset the 35-40% immigrant/native wage differential. 
Assimilation is a function of immigrants’ human capital: while college degree immigrants earn 30% 
more than average natives, immigrants who arrive with low schooling levels never attain the average 
native earning levels (Card 2005).
13
 
Economic assimilation research in Europe started a little later and has been mainly based on 
national panel data. The core of empirical models has been: the immigrant’s education before arrival, 
and after arrival; his/her acquisition of human capital on the job before and after immigration; and 
his/her proficiency in the language of the destination country, which also favors integration in the 
second generation. Chiswick (1991) found that knowledge of the native language was crucial for 
assimilation into the British labour market, a result confirmed by Shields and Wheastley Price (2002), 
and also by a more recent study by Dustmann and Van Soest (2002), Dustmann and Fabbri (2003) and 
Chiswick and Miller (2012).  
In Denmark
14
 Neilson et al. (2000) found that job assimilation increases for foreign nationals, not 
with the number of years that s/he has been in the country, but with the number of years that s/he has 
worked in the country. These authors thus emphasize that workers increase their human capital only 
when they are working, not just during their presence in the destination country. Kee (1994), for the 
Netherlands, concludes that one of the causes of the lack of assimilation of foreign workers is that only 
few immigrants continue their studies in the receiving country. Also Grainer and Marciano (1975) 
basing their studies on France and using data from the 1968 census in a descriptive way, reach the 
same conclusions. They suggest that the lower average wages for foreign nationals with a nuclear 
family is mainly due to lower investment in human capital, and this varies substantially across ethnic 
groups. 
The process of assimilation, however, also depends on the characteristics of immigrants who 
remain in the destination country. As Borjas (1985), Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) and Dustmann (2003 
and 2007) stress in their articles on the return decisions of migrants, foreign nationals who remain are 
typically the best or the worst of the group.
15
 The migrant decides to return if the migration project 
fails or, in the opposite case, if the migration project is very successful and allows the migrant to 
return home and start a business there. If those who remain are the best, the empirical estimates of 
assimilation will be biased upwards (over-assimilation). Alternatively, if those who remain are the 
worst, the estimates will be biased downwards (under-assimilation). In both cases they are 
inconsistent. The modeling of the re-migration decision – as Dustmann (1996, 2003) terms it – is used 
as a first step to control for the selectivity of assimilation. Dustmann (2003)
16
, Constant and Massey 
(2003) and Fertig and Schurer (2007) modeled the return decision as a migration decision function of 
                                                     
13
 David Card (2005) stresses that it is probably more relevant and interesting to understand if the second generation of 
migrant is assimilating, and that it would be a more complete measure of the long run parental assimilation process. His 
results show that immigrants working in the US labour market earn today less than natives (but not a lot less), and that 
different education levels explain 10% of the gap. 
14
 They used administrative data and test a random effect model on foreign wages. 
15
 Since his 1985 article Borjas has stressed the selectivity of the migration decision as a function of the human capital 
return of migration. In his 1996 article with Bratsberg he also considers the selectivity of the return decision using a 
cross-sectional approach while always referring to a Roy return of human capital model.  
16
 Dustmann (2003) specifically inquires into the role played by changes in the income in the destination countries in 
determining the duration of staying.  
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the income differential and use family ties as instruments. The correction is introduced into the wage 
equation to analyze assimilation
17
.  
Recent research on return migration and return migration policies focus more on the role played by 
economic prospects in the countries of origin in attracting migrants back home: e.g. Cassarino (2007) 
for the Maghreb areas; Mansoor and Quillin (2006) for many European and Central Asian countries; 
and Venturini and Villosio (2008) for migrants in Italy. 
Other relevant variables are related to labour market changes which determine a worker’s future 
prospect. Not only is the business cycle upon arrival crucial for an immigrant’s assimilation. So too is 
the employment sector, which is affected in different ways by technological innovation. Rosholm et 
al. (2006) found that, between 1985 and 1995, both in Sweden and Denmark, job opportunities for 
male immigrants deteriorated. However, by using a panel of administrative data they showed that the 
migrant situation worsened independently from the different market trends in the two countries. This 
situation was due, instead, to structural changes in the markets, where the labor demand was for 
workers with high communication skills, consequently immigrants were at a disadvantage. 
An additional factor in the assimilation process is imputed to migrant networks and communities 
(Borjas, 1992, 1995, Cutler and Glaeser, 1997). This has been reviewed by Hatton and Leigh (2007), 
who abandon the individual analysis of assimilation and shift to an analysis of assimilation for the 
community itself. The migrant’s network can exert a positive effect by favouring the job search and 
job match. But it can also have a negative effect by reducing the social integration-interaction of 
immigrants: for example, knowledge of the host country’s language (see e.g. Chiswik 1991, Dustmann 
and van Soest 2002, Dustmann and Fabbri 2003, Shields and Wheatley Price, 2002, Danzer and 
Yaman 2012), and in general of the informal life rules which prevail in the destination countries. 
Policies have been adopted to discourage the agglomeration of immigrants in particular areas, which 
has been considered a cause of low linguistic proficiency and which constitutes a disincentive to move 
in search of better job opportunities. In North European countries, however, the distribution of refugee 
immigrants around the country seems to be less efficient in integrating foreign nationals than the 
previous agglomeration model (Husted et al. 2001). 
3. The assimilation model and return migration 
The assimilation model used here is the traditional human capital model adopted by Chiswick, in 
1978. We explicitly include measures of human capital acquired on the job and out of the job and 
control for selection in return migration. 
The dependent variable is a measure of the individual log weekly wage [Yit] which depends on 
individual fixed effects [αi], individual time variant human capital variables [xit] and a worker’s job 
characteristics [zit]. In addition we control for different economic cycle [mrst] which affect both the 
region [r] and the sector [s] where the workers are employed and the size of the migrant’s network [c] 
in the destination area [kcrt] which can favor or reduce the economic integration of migrants.  
The process of assimilation, however, also depends on the characteristics of immigrants who 
remain in the destination country. If there is a systematic link between the decision to stay and labour 
market outcomes, a fixed effect estimate eliminates the bias. If it is not systematic, fixed effect 
estimates may give unreliable parameter estimates and we need to proceed in two stages. 
In order to model the selection of immigrants that leave the destination country we follow two 
tracts. 
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 To better explain what we are doing later on we name “static Heckman correction type” the correction which does not 
take into account the duration of stay as for instance in Fertig and Schurer (2007).  
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First we abandon the use of a “static” Heckman correction that implies that in each period the 
migrant decides whether to stay or to leave without memory of his previous experience
18
. We, instead, 
follow the approach of Dustmann (2003) in describing the return decision as a function of the year of 
arrival in the destination country and of Constant, Massey (2003) by explicitly modeling a version of 
Heckman correction to deal with the combination of selection and duration.  
Assume that the log weekly wage equation has the following form 
rst crtit it it i it
(1) Y f (x ,z ,m ,k ;a )   
where f(.) is a function of the variables and effects mentioned above. ηit is normally distributed with 
zero mean and is independent of the variables and effects inside f. Let Tis be the individual’s length of 
stay in the destination country, given that the individual arrived in year s. (To this end we suppress the 
subscript i which accounts for the fact that s varies across individuals i). We assume that 
g(Tits)=qitγ+εit, where εit is normally distributed with zero mean and variance τ
2
, g is a suitable 
monotonic increasing transformation and t+s is the year when the wage is observed. Note that εit/ τ is 
normally distributed (0,1). qit are some observed variables that will be explained below. We assume 
that ηit and εit are normally jointly distributed. We assume that the time of arrival is uncorrelated with 
ηit. Let φ denote the p.d.f of the standard normal distribution and let Φ be the corresponding c.d.f. We 
only have wage observations for those who are still in the country in year t+s. We thus have a 
selection problem. As mentioned already we shall derive a duration version of Heckman’s procedure 
(Heckman, 1979) to control for possible selectivity bias.  
To do so, note that due to the normality assumption we can write ηit=ρ εit+νit, 
where νit is normally distributed and independent of εit, and where ρ is the correlation coefficient. 
Let 1{ }denote the indicator function. We then get for any real number a that 
it it
it it it it
a /
a a
(2) E( 1{ a}) E( 1{ a}) E( 1{ ) x (x)dx ( )


 
              
   
 
From (2) we then get the inverse Mill’s ratio 
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The qit are macro-economic variables of the countries of origin as attractors for migrants who go back 
home (GDP growth in origin country)
19
 and of other possible destination countries (GDP growth in 
other preferred destination countries) as measures of job opportunities in other countries
20
. Note that 
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 Fertig and Schuler (2007) for instance use what we call a static Heckman correction, but their data set is very rich and 
they are able to control for the family ties with the origin countries, which frequently proxies the duration of stay abroad.  
19
 The attempt to introduce income dispersion in the origin country to capture the different income opportunity has been 
abandoned because of the difficulty of good time series income dispersion. 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/wiid/ presents a large amount of information on income dispersion 
but their time series dimension is not always reliable, and different values are frequently induced by changes in the 
methodology adopted, not by a real change in income distribution. The other dataset of Freeman and Osterndoorp 
http://www.nber.org/oww/, which has recently been used by Belot and Hatton (2008) and Grogger and Hanson (2008) 
does not use the panel structure of the dataset and calculates an average wage premium for each country using all the 
annual information available. 
20
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the selection term is the conditional expectation of the error term in the log wage equation, conditional 
on the length of stay Tits being at least as long as the length of time from arrival in the country to when 
the wage is observed. From (2) we then get that s+t enters in the correction term. In estimating the log 
weekly wage equation we account for the possible selection by employing this duration version of the 
inverse Mill’s ratio. 
The second track taken in controlling for selection is the use of a proportional hazard rate function 
h(t) for the probability of leaving the host country at time t conditional on surviving to time t-1. The 
proportional hazard rate model assumes that the covariates have a multiplicative effect on the hazard 
rate function, given the values of the covariates and the respective survival time (t). The reason for 
employing the hazard rate function is that it is an alternative specification for a selection term which 
also accounts for duration effects.  
i 0 it(5) h(t ) h (t)g(q )   
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function, the hazard for the individual when all independent variable 
values are equal to zero, and g(qit) is a function of the covariates.
21
 
The log weekly wage equation is augmented by a selection term for return migration: 
(6) itsritrstcrtititiit mkzxY    
where [λit] is the duration version of the inverted Mill Ratio that capture selection when the selection 
model (4) is used; or the log of the hazard rate when the selection model (5) is chosen (note that in the 
first case ω = τρ);  
[r] are region fixed effects, [s]are sector fixed effects and [εit] is an idiosyncratic error component. 
Note too that there are fixed effects in the wage equation, but not in the selection terms. 
4. Description of the data and the variables used 
The only longitudinal dataset which enables distinctions among different types of immigrants, foreign 
nationals and natives, is WHIP – Work Histories Italian Panel
22
, a database of individual work 
histories based on Italian social security (INPS) archives. The reference population is made up of all 
the people – Italian and foreign – who have worked in Italy even for only part of their working careers 
as employees or self-employed workers or who have received income support or pensions from INPS. 
Open-ended contracts in the public sector and selected professions which have autonomous social 
security funds (i.e. lawyers or notaries) are excluded (about 15% of the labour force). This limitation is 
not particularly important for foreign nationals, who are rarely employed in the public sector, where 
entrance is made more difficult by public selection exams. It is more important though for the analysis 
of the integration of native immigrants, especially women, who frequently participate successfully in 
these selection exams and who are assigned to jobs in other areas. 
Only the WHIP section concerning dependent employment is used in this paper. This is a linked 
employer-employee database that combines individual and job characteristics from 1985 to 2003. It is 
a panel with no attrition because it is compulsory for firms to provide information about their workers 
to INPS. We thus restrict our analysis to dependent employment in the private sector. Besides public-
sector employees and self-employed workers, workers in the agricultural sector (5%) and domestic 
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 Generally, g(xj) is assumed to be equal to the relative risk e
xjβ. The model is estimated assuming h0(t) to be a Weibull 
distribution, thus h0(t)=pt
p-1, where p is the shape parameter to be estimated from the data. Very similar results are also 
obtained without imposing h0(t) to be a specific distribution, following the Cox partial likelihood estimation. 
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workers (4.8%) are also excluded. This last limitation is important for analyses of foreign labour 
market integration because a large share of immigrants work in these two sectors: according to the 
ISTAT Labour Force Survey 2010, 3.9% of foreign nationals work in agriculture and 18.7% work as 
domestic workers. In particular, given the female monopoly in domestic services and its growing 
importance, the share of females among all residency or work permits is much greater (about 45-50%) 
than that reported in the WHIP dataset, where male employment dominates (84%). However, 
agriculture and domestic work have very high shares of illegal employment, and their exclusion from 
our analysis increases homogeneity across sectors. We should also point out here that studies on 
family migration describe female migrants as followers in the migratory process and as secondary 
workers. Hence we expect larger differences among the three groups in this case. This feature is not 
limited to foreign immigrants alone; it is also characteristic of native immigrants who were attracted to 
the North by a booming manufacturing industry, and whose families followed later. 
For all these reasons we exclude women from our analysis. Moreover, in order to avoid 
measurement errors due to the limited number of observations for foreign nationals in the first years, 
we have restricted our focus from 1990 to 2003, when most of the foreign inflows started (see Figure 
1). We have also restricted it to (male) workers aged 18-45 in order to compare foreign nationals with 
the most homogeneous group of Italian workers. 
With this dataset we can distinguish among different types of workers: Foreign immigrants, Native 
immigrants and Locals. 
1. Locals: workers who are mainly employed in their birth area; 
2. Native immigrants: workers born in Italy who are employed in a geographical area different 
from that of their birth; 
3. Foreign immigrants: Workers born abroad. 
To identify native migrants we used four macro areas of origin and destination (North West, North 
East, Centre and South) to avoid, as far as possible, counting commuting workers as native migrants. 
Commuters are quite numerous, and according to the local register they do not change residency. 
Instead, by concentrating on changes in these macro areas in the identification of native migrants, we 
are in line with the Italian perception of native migrants as only long-distance migrants.  
Foreign workers were selected by using place of birth: the dataset did not contain information on 
nationality. Only workers born outside Europe and the main industrialised countries were chosen, in 
order to avoid counting Italians born abroad as immigrants. Moreover, workers born in Argentina, 
Brazil and Venezuela23 were also excluded, because those are countries with high Italian emigration 
and with large return migration flows from Latin America.  
The variables in the dataset allow us to control for the age of the worker, gender, type of contract 
(open-ended, fixed-term, part-time), the skill level (blue-collar, white-collar, highly-skilled white-
collar, manager), firm size, sector of economic activity, and territorial area. However, the dataset had 
some important limitations. 
The main weakness of the dataset is the lack of an education variable. Though for native locals and 
immigrants we might expect that age and skill level would proxy the education level, for foreign 
nationals these two variables are unfortunately not enough. After all, the number of years spent at 
school would not be a good proxy for the educational level, nor, indeed, would it be a good proxy for 
the productivity of a foreign worker. After all, education quality is very difficult to compare inside a 
country and it is even more difficult across countries as Razin and Wahba (2011) have shown. We 
cannot use the Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) measure of cognitive differences because it is a time 
invariant variable which will disappear in the assimilation equation. In addition we had no information 
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about the time of arrival of foreign immigrants. However, this problem perhaps can be countered. 
Foreign migrants did not enter Italy, in any great numbers, before 1985 (when our dataset started). In 
addition, they entered formal and legal employment by means of repeated amnesties. They were thus 
likely to have arrived on average two years before their first legal enrolment in the WHIP dataset. We 
are thus able to proxy the time of arrival that is included in the selection term.  
Focusing on prime age males, the subjects of the assimilation analysis, we find that, on average, the 
wage of native immigrants is 6-10% higher than the wage of locals in all periods. However, this 
difference is never statistically significant (see Figure 3). The wage differentials between foreign 
nationals and either local or native immigrants are more irregular: they were quite stable during the 
1990s, but they have increased since 2000. In 2003 foreign wages were on average about 75% of those 
of locals and about 70% of those of native immigrants; and, on average, from 1990 to 2003, foreign 
workers earned 21% less than natives and worked 20% less than natives (Venturini and Villosio, 
2008).  
The differences between foreign nationals and natives, both locals and internal immigrants, are, in 
large part, due to their different characteristics and the strong inflows of foreign migrants that Italy has 
experienced in the last years (Table 1). 
Foreign migrants are younger than local workers, who are also younger than native immigrants. In 
fact, South-North migration took place mainly after the Second World War and continued then at a 
slower pace, while foreign migration is much more recent. Thus foreign workers make up the 
youngest group.  
Native immigrants are relatively more present in the large and very large firms which dominated 
Italian development during the 1960s: while foreign migrants are concentrated in small firms, which, 
instead, dominated economic development during the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, 25% of foreign 
migrants are concentrated in very small firms (1-20 employees) against respectively 7% and 11% for 
native immigrants and for locals. While native locals are employed throughout the country, native 
immigrants are mainly employed in the North West. During the 1960s, the North West was a booming 
Fordist industrial area which attracted labour from all over the country. Foreign nationals, instead, are 
mainly located both in the North West, and in the North East; the area which boomed during the 1980s 
and 1990s. 
Blue-collar employment dominates in all groups, and for foreign nationals blue-collar work 
represents 93% of total employment. Blue-collar employment is also important among native 
immigrants because they moved to the North when labour demand was concentrated in large 
manufacturing companies. Finally, foreign immigrants are concentrated in the construction sector. 
To capture the effect of human and social capital on wage assimilation two variables were put 
together [xit]. The first referred to human capital accumulated on the job – experience in the current 
and previous jobs – and it was measured by the number of months in regular employment. The second 
variable measured the months spent out of the “job”. These months might have included periods 
devoted to education, employment in sectors not covered by the dataset, unemployment, irregular 
employment and, for foreign nationals, temporary return home. This second variable could, thus, play 
a positive role in the labour market, by capturing the acquisition of human capital in the underground 
economy or the acquisition of more general social capital outside the labour market. Alternatively, it 
could play or a negative role by reducing human capital accumulation. And the role would differ 
according to the group of reference. For locals, the periods of non-employment are expected to affect 
wages negatively, while for native immigrants this is not necessarily the case: they could acquire 
human capital working illegally or working in another sector or they could be unemployed and thus 
have a negative impact on wages. In the case of foreign immigrants the negative impact should be 
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lower because a longer presence in the host country, even if not in employment, might positively 
affect the migrant’s social capital. Their social capital, then, , in turn, helps on the labour market.
24
  
To control for the demand side and in particular for the different trends in different economic 
sectors, we included in our specification two macro-economic variables: the change in the log value 
added by sector and region; and the unemployment rate by region. This was done because we wanted 
to control for the different sector trends where workers were employed and also to see how this 
affected their wages. 
Finally, the role of the migrant community in the destination area [kcrt] was captured by the share of 
the migrant worker community (nationality for foreign migrants and region of birth for native 
migrants) in total regional employment. Anderson et al. (2009) shows that the quantity and quality of 
the enclaves matter in the wage upgrade of foreign nationals. Hatton and Leigh (2007) stress the long-
term effect of the community variable, and even employ ten-year lags. However, as migration in Italy 
is quite recent, we had too few observations to use long lags such as the one suggested by them.  
5. Results 
5.1 Return migration 
According to our model, the first step in any empirical analysis is an estimate for the probability of 
foreign nationals leaving; modelled both with a duration version of the inverse Mill’s ratio and with a 
hazard function.  
The selection process is more likely for foreign nationals, while native immigrants are not different 
from locals in this respect. The hazard ratio of exiting definitively is 0.5 higher for foreign nationals 
than the hazard for locals and native immigrants. This is so even when individual, job and career 
characteristics are controlled for (see Table 2).
 
 
Though we do not exactly know their destination when leaving, it is likely that most foreign 
nationals move home or at least abroad. The literature shows that temporary migrations are frequent, 
and the rule rather than the exception (see Dustmann 1996, and Venturini 2007 for an overview). Even 
if, over the short run, they transit into unemployment or irregular jobs, if they are unable to find a legal 
job again, over the medium term they will leave the country.  
The stronger effects of selection among foreign nationals rather than among natives points to the 
need to control for selection bias in the wage equation. The empirical results will show whether 
migrants are self selected, i.e. if they are the best or the worst in terms of unobservable skills and 
abilities. 
In order to capture the pull factors of any migrant exit we included variables for the country of 
origin and for other possible destinations (for the description of how we computed the GDP growth of 
other possible destinations see Appendix A and Table A1), as well as the duration of stay.  
The results when employing the duration extended Heckman selection terms show that the 
probability of leaving increases with the immigrant’s presence in the host country. This is captured by 
the variable months spent in employment showing a positive sign (Table 3, i). 
Similarly, the results from the hazard rate version of the selection process (see Table 3, ii) show a 
strong negative duration dependence (the probability of leaving increases the longer the migrant is in 
the country). This demonstrates that the choice of a hazard model for the selection equation is 
particularly appropriate. The hazard model was estimated by assuming h0(t) to be a Weibull 
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distribution thus h0(t)=pt
p-1
. The value of the shape parameter [p] estimated from the data was greater 
than 1 (p=1.64). This means that the hazard of failure increases over time. This result confirms 
negative duration dependence, and, therefore, the temporary character of the migration project. 
Both models also suggest that economic growth in origin countries attracts emigrants back. 
Similarly, economic prospects in other possible destination countries positively affect the probability 
of immigrants leaving Italy. 
5.2 Assimilation results 
The second step in the analysis is the estimation of the assimilation equation augmented, for foreign 
nationals, by the selection term for return migration. 
The equation is estimated by an OLS fixed effects estimate
25
 to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity among individuals (results reported in Table 4). 
As expected no striking differences are found among the three groups of workers. The Italian 
labour market is, in fact, quite closely regulated and collective agreements cover both unionised and 
non-unionised workers. However, since the 1993 Income Policy Agreement, wage variability has 
increased because firms are allowed to adjust their wage structure according to their economic 
performance and to local labour market conditions (Devincenti et al. 2008).  
Starting from the selectivity control, the Inverse Mills Ratio coefficient (significant at 5% level) as 
well as the log hazard rate
26
 (significant at 1% level) indicates a positive correlation between the error 
terms in the return decision and the wage function. Thus, the higher the expected weekly wage, the 
higher the probability of leaving. The unobservables that positively influence the wage of migrants, 
negatively influence their decision to stay. All things being equal, foreign workers who earn more are 
more likely to leave their present employment, while the less remunerated are less likely to abandon 
their present job. This result shows that the main factor driving permanent movement out of 
employment is the lack of opportunities and/or low incomes, and that their most likely destination is a 
foreign country
27
 . This kind of selection is not unusual in a comparative sense: it was found, for 
instance, by Constant and Massey (2003) in their analysis of guest-workers in Germany in 1984; by 
Fertig and Shurer’s (2007) in some cohorts of migrants who arrived in Germany between 1969 and 
1973, and among Finnish return migrants from Sweden by Rooth and Saarela (2007). 
All the human capital variables are significant with the expected sign. The age variable is more 
important for locals, even if it declines at a higher rate, followed by native immigrants and foreign 
nationals, while experience on the job is more important for native immigrants than for the other two 
groups of workers and declines at a very low rate for foreign migrants. 
Periods spent out of employment have a negative effect only for local workers’ wages (as in Edin 
and Gustavsson 2008). They are not significant for native immigrants, nor, indeed, for foreign ones. 
Immigrants are the most mobile group in the labour force, so that foreign nationals may increase their 
social capital while they are out of employment and thus they do not necessarily lose in terms of total 
productivity. Nor are native immigrants negatively affected by their time off the job. This result 
highlights, as in the cases mentioned before, the importance of experience on the job in the 
assimilation of immigrants. It also underlines the fact that, for migrants, less damage is caused by time 
off a job. 
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Macro variables help explain the wage dynamics of the three groups of workers in different ways. 
Any value added in the sectors and regions pushes up the wages of all groups, but foreign migrants are 
more sensitive to this. The regional unemployment rate matters only for the local Italians: in fact, it 
slows down the wage growth of native locals. This result should not be surprising because 
unemployment is mostly made up of native unemployed workers with skills different from those of 
foreign migrants and less mobile than native immigrants: the inverse relationship between 
unemployment and wages holds only for local workers.  
Last, but not least, the community variable is significant for foreign and native migrants, and has a 
negative sign. This is not an unusual result comparatively speaking: for instance, Hatton and Leigh 
(2007) and Danzer and Yaman (2012) found a negative sign for the community variable in the UK. If 
we recall that the variable adopted is not a proxy for the size of the total immigrant community, but 
represents rather the size of the worker community coming from the same area, the negative sign is 
less puzzling. The result points to a supply effect, which reduces wage growth more among foreign 
than among native immigrants. The variable measures the network effect which can favour the job 
match, but which can also create a segmentation effect which pulls down upgrading
28
.  
We now turn to the human capital variables and to the wage assimilation pattern of migrants. The 
cumulative effect of human-capital variables shows that foreign male migrants never assimilate with 
native migrants or with locals, because Italian age coefficients – for locals and native migrants – are 
smaller than theirs.  
Figure 4 shows the accumulated effect of human capital variables on wages for the three groups of 
workers. The profiles of locals and native immigrants are not statistically different from each another, 
while they are statistically different from those of foreign nationals. A test for common coefficient 
restrictions was run on a pooled regression of (a) native immigrants and locals, (b) foreign nationals 
and locals. The null hypothesis that all the coefficients for native immigrants and foreign nationals are 
zero was accepted for native immigrants
29
 and rejected for foreign nationals
30
 . 
Workers from different groups start their career at the same wage level. However, as experience 
increases the profiles of foreign nationals and natives start to diverge, showing a wage gap of about 
11% after 5 years of experience in the labour market and more than 18% after 10 years of experience. 
However, the graph does not include the periods spent outside employment, which have a negative 
effect on native wages which do not penalize native and foreign migrants. 
To the best of our knowledge, our approach and the corresponding results are the first to address 
the assimilation of native immigrants. For though this issue has been discussed in the sociological 
literature, it has never been verified with a large dataset. What is more, the empirical results contradict 
the main conclusions of sociologists, Pugliese (2002), Paci (1973), Fofi(1975), which stresses the 
slight economic and social assimilation of native migrants. Our results suggest, instead, that the 
economic assimilation of native migrants cannot be questioned and only their social assimilation 
should remain on the research agenda. 
Research in Italy has already shown that migrants do not assimilate to the same extent as natives: 
Venturini, Villosio (2008) with the same dataset; and Reyneri, Fullin (2012) and Dell’Aringa and 
Pagani (2011) employing several years of the Labour Force Survey, though no explanation of the 
differential was given. 
The increasing differences between the wage profile of locals and foreign nationals suggests again 
the under-assimilation of foreign nationals. These do not close the wage gap with native immigrants. 
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They can be indirectly imputed to the initial differences in language and social capital. These, as we 
have seen, do not grow smaller with the time spent in the country, even if migrants likely improve 
their language skills and increase their social capital in the destination area. This is also imputable to 
the selectivity of the migrants who remain in Italy: these tend not to be the best. 
It must also be remembered that native internal migration is older than foreign migration to Italy. 
The different time of entrance could play an important role in explaining the under-assimilation of the 
last wave of migrants. We, therefore, control for the time of entrance. An additional cause of under-
assimilation not captured by the sector fixed effect is the type of job that foreign migrants typically 
undertake. Thus to control for this we define migrant intense sectors and perform the previous test on 
workers employed in those and other sectors. 
5.3 Assimilation of entrants in employment in 1991 and 1992 for all groups 
It is also necessary to control for heterogeneity in jobs available when migrants entered the labour 
market and thus the economic cycle. We, therefore, selected the native and foreign workers entering 
the labour market in the same years, 1991 and 1992, and followed their assimilation patterns. 
Some of the results presented in the previous section may have been affected by the different 
economic cycles prevailing at the time of entrance into employment. This would have conditioned the 
future wage path and the future wage assimilation process
31
. Here is a typical problem in empirical 
analyses of migration. However, it becomes even more important in the case at hand because while 
native locals enter the labour market throughout the period, foreign nationals arrived in the late 1980s, 
while a large share of native immigrants did so in the 1970s. Of course, age and experience capture the 
human capital embodied by the worker and the macro variables capture different regional and sector 
economic cycles. But, in order to control more carefully for the differences in the assimilation pattern 
among the three groups, we selected a subsample comprising only workers that entered in the labour 
market in the same period. We thus perform the estimates only with workers who entered the labour 
market in the same two years: 1991 and 1992. 
Table 6 sets out the results. Better controls for the economic cycle do not change the picture. As in 
the general case, the selection for return is positive, the age variable has a higher impact on wages for 
locals and the experience variable for native immigrants. Hence foreign migrants never catch up. The 
macro variables exert the effect already found in the general analysis: the value added is positive for 
all groups, and unemployment is effective only for locals. The community variable is significant only 
for the foreign group, where it is negative implying a negative agglomeration effect. 
Compare now the results on assimilation in the subsample of the entrants in 1991-92 with the 
overall sample results. We find a similar non-assimilating profile between foreign nationals and 
natives, and a very similar profile between native migrants and locals. However, contrary to the 
general results, a wage differential between the three groups emerges at entrance too. For foreign 
nationals the gap with locals is 15% at entrance, rises to 23% after five years of experience, and 
reaches 26% after 10 years of experience, as Figure 5 shows. For native migrants the gap with locals is 
about 8% at entrance but it vanishes after 10 years of labour market experience.  
The results seem again to show that the accumulation of human capital variables matter and that 
native migrants are better off because they are able to accumulate more human capital. 
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5.4 Assimilation by jobs of entrance 
Finally, to better understand the causes of the under-assimilation of foreign migrants we look at 
entrance onto the labour market. We divided locals and foreign nationals between those starting their 
observed career in sectors with high density of foreign workforce (the majority of foreign workers) 
and those starting in different sectors.  
We looked separately at the wage profiles of workers who enter and spend most of their career in 
the “immigrant sector”. The vast majority of foreign workers in Italy are employed in low-wage 
manual jobs. The data used contains information on the sector of economic activity of the firm by 
three-digit level (more than 160 different sectors). This sector detail combined with the information on 
occupation (blue and white collar) allows us to characterise jobs in great detail. We computed the 
average share of foreign workers from 1990 to 2003 in more than 160 jobs identified by the 
combination of three-digit sector and blue collar occupation
32
. The variability in this share is very 
high. There are sectors in construction and manufacturing where the share of foreign workers is over 
30%, even reaching 60%, while the presence of immigrants is almost null in many sub-sectors of the 
services. We define “Migrant sectors” as the 47 sectors in which the share of foreign employment is 
higher: 1.5 times the average share (i.e. higher than 15%)
33
. These sectors employ more than 70% of 
the foreign workers in our sample, while, on the contrary they employ fewer than 40% of locals (Table 
7). Locals in “migrants’ job” earn on average 22% less than workers in other sectors, and their wage 
differential with foreign immigrants in similar jobs is reduced to 4% from the average 12% reported in 
table 1.  
In addition to being low-paid, “Migrant sectors” represent a trap for most foreign immigrants. In 
fact, almost all foreign nationals (84%) who start their working career in these sectors will never move 
to different jobs, while this happens for a still high 64% of locals who start their career in “migrant 
jobs”. 
Our analysis by sectors defined as described, show that such sector segmentation is primarily 
responsible for the lack of assimilation between foreign nationals and locals. 
If we compare the wage profiles of foreign nationals and locals who spend all their (observed) 
working career in such jobs, we find that they are almost similar (Figure 6, Figure 7 and Table 10). 
When confined to the “migrant sectors”, the effect of the accumulation of experience for locals is 
similar to that for foreign nationals and lower for local workers who work in other sectors. It is lower 
also with respect to those local workers who start in the “migrant sectors”, but who are able to escape 
from them later in their working life. 
Thus, most of the non-assimilating profile highlighted in the previous sections comes from the 
difference in the jobs held by groups of workers at the beginning of their career. This has very little to 
do with linguistic and human capital accumulation. 
6. Concluding comments 
This paper has focused on the wage assimilation of male migrants in the Italian labour market. Italy 
has a recent history of foreign migration but a longer history of internal migration from the South to 
the North. The aim of the paper has been to understand the pattern of assimilation of foreign migrants 
with respect to native migrants, i.e. internal migrants, and locals. This is a unique opportunity, an 
experiment, where we can compare local workers and native migrants who are proficient in the 
language of the destination country but who are nevertheless migrants. Both groups of migrants have 
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been compared to native locals, who represent the linguistic benchmark and the social capital of 
reference.  
For this purpose, we used the administrative dataset on dependent employment, WHIP, which 
enabled us to distinguish between foreign, local and native immigrant workers; a comparison not 
previously made. Moreover, by using this dataset we were able to build variables intended to capture 
human capital in the job and out of the job. A fixed effect model of log weekly wage of males aged 
18-45, which controlled for unobserved heterogeneity and selection in return migration, was carried 
out.  
In particular, two different methods to estimate return migration were implemented taking into 
account the duration of stay in the destination country: the Heckman correction model which is 
redefined in term of duration
34
 and the Hazard rate model.  
The results showed:  
First, that native locals and native migrants experience only minor differences in terms of labour 
market assimilation. Thanks to this analysis, the first, which use a large dataset and an econometric 
technique, all the debate on discrimination (Pugliese 2002) and the segregation of internal migrants 
should be revised and limited to social assimilation because the differences in economic assimilation 
are limited. 
Second, we saw the presence of a positive selection in the return decision. Those that are best able 
to earn higher wages are more likely to head home or to other destinations. There is a negative 
selection in the assimilation pattern with both measures: the Duration version of the Inverse Mills 
Ratio and the Hazard function. This should be kept in mind when considering the assimilation result. 
Third, foreign workers have an entrance wage similar to those of natives. However, the 
accumulation of experience increases the wage gap with natives. Time out of employment does not 
negatively affect foreign wages, showing a possible general non-negative effect for the months spent 
out of the job, while it is negative for the natives. 
Fourth, the concentration of a community has a negative effect on the economic assimilation of all 
migrants both foreign and native. This suggests that large interactions within the community of origin 
abroad disadvantage all migrants, but particularly foreign nationals.  
Fifth, the assimilation behaviour of internal native immigrants and locals is very similar, and this 
result provides indirect evidence that language and social capital matter for economic assimilation. In 
order to better understand the reasons behind the under-assimilation of foreign migrants, two types of 
checks have been made. Given the different timing of the entrance of native migrants and foreign 
migrants we controlled for similar time of entrance by selecting a sub-sample made up of the entrants 
onto the labour market in 1991 and 1992. Second, we controlled the assimilation pattern within sectors 
by selecting the more intense immigrant sectors. The control of the entrance period confirms the 
under-assimilation of foreign nationals and the quasi assimilation of native migrants which seems to 
confirm the indirect evidence of the importance of language and social capital.  
Last the analysis by sectors shows that native migrants and even local workers in the sectors where 
the migrants are concentrated have the same wage profile. The probability of not-exiting from these 
sectors is 84% for foreign migrants and 64% for natives. Thus it is not the lack of language knowledge 
or the social capital of the destination country which reduces the assimilation of foreign nationals. 
Rather they are limited by their starting employment sector, which means low wage and no career 
progress. 
                                                     
34
 The Heckman correction term using a duration approach was implicitly applied by Constant and Massey 2003, but it was 
not explicitly modeled. 
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This last result also sheds light upon the negative role of the community where regional and sector 
concentration interact causing the under assimilation of foreign migrants. In particular the negative 
selection of the foreign migrant group is explained by the difficulties that foreign migrants find in 
changing job. This encourages the best to go elsewhere in search of better opportunities. 
To sum up, the comparison among the assimilation patterns of foreign and national migrants seems 
to confirm that return decisions matter in the assimilation dynamic. This is probably affected by the 
very limited career options that the jobs taken by foreign migrants offer, either to them and to the 
native locals and migrants. Sector segregation seems the key driver in the under assimilation of foreign 
migrants. Language and social capital probably also matter but much less so than sector segregation.  
Thus selective immigration policies and language training could help in reducing foreign under-
assimilation. However, they would help only if they allow foreign workers to escape from those work 
sectors where they are concentrated. These policies should also counter the negative role played by the 
migrant community itself, which probably reinforces employment participation in the high foreign 
migrant sectors. Given the rapid aging of the population, foreign migrants are set to become a 
permanent fixture and eventually citizens. Italy should invest in integration policies designed to 
prevent the formation of a closed group of foreign workers who have little chance of upgrading and 
who are characterised by community and professional segmentation. 
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Appendix 
A. Procedure used to compute GDP growth rate in possible destination counties 
In order to build a measure of job opportunities in other possible destination countries (not exclusively 
European Countries) we use the growth rate of Real GDP per capita weighted by the flows of 
migration in the most chosen destination countries apart from Italy. 
In particular for each nationality in our sample we first computed total outflow, then the share of flows 
towards each of the main destinations in each year, 1990-2003, then we weighted the annual growth 
rate of Real GDP per capita for each destination by this share. We obtained an indicator of the 
attractiveness of other possible destination for each group of migrants. 
Table A1 shows the other main destination countries for the main origin groups in our sample. 
Table A1. 
Main destination countries and share of flows in 1990 and 2003 by origin (Italy excluded) 
 
Origin group 
 
Main destination countries (share of total flows in the first year 1990 
and in the last year 2003 in parenthesis) 
  
Albania  Germany (5.2; 4.9), Greece (94.8; 95.1) 
Algeria Belgium (2.8; 1.9), Canada (11.8; 7.2), France (57.5; 73.4), Germany 
(20.6; 6.6), Spain (2.4; 9.0), United States (4.9; 2.0) 
Bangladesh Australia (4.9; 5.7), Canada (4.5; 14.1), France (0.9; 2.1), Germany 
(10.9; 4.2), Spain (0.1; 2.5), United Kingdom (42.5; 37.1), United 
States (36.2; 34.3) 
China Australia (2.1; 3.1), Canada (5.3; 12.1), Germany (3.6; 5.3), Korea 
(43.7; 19.2), Japan (19.6; 30.7), Netherlands (0.7; 1.3), New Zealand 
(2.8; 2.0), Spain (0.5; 2.5), United Kingdom (0.7; 10.3), United States 
(20.9; 13.5) 
Egypt Canada (6.9; 8.4), Germany (8.8; 7.0), United States (14.3; 14.6), 
Saudi Arabia (70.0) 
Turkey Austria (5.0; 12.0), Belgium (2.1; 4.4), Canada (0.6; 1.7), France (3.1; 
9.9), Germany (70.5; 57.2), Netherlands (10.7; 7.1), Switzerland (5.1; 
3.2), United Kingdom (0.8; 1.1), United States (2.1; 3.5) 
Tunisia Belgium (8.1; 3.8), Canada (4.6; 4.9), France (35.8; 70.2), Germany 
(48.5; 18.2), United States (3.0; 2.6) 
Pakistan Australia (3.6; 2.9), Canada (9.6; 34.2), Germany (20.5; 9.1), United 
Kingdom (22.5; 27.7), United States (43.8; 26.1) 
Sri Lanka Australia (19.8; 13.6), Canada (18.9; 26.6), France (5.0; 8.2), Germany 
(43.5; 8.1), United Kingdom (6.0; 35.9), United States (6.8; 7.5) 
Senegal France (54.1; 43.6), Spain (13.9; 47.7), United States (32.1; 8.7) 
Romania Belgium (0.5; 1.0), Canada (3.0; 5.5), France (0.7; 1.6), Germany 
(85.0; 23.7), Hungary (5.5; 9.6), Spain (0.2; 55.0), United States (5.1; 
3.7) 
Philippines Australia (4.3; 2.0), Canada (8.0; 6.6), Germany (2.3; 1.9), Japan 
(32.5; 51.6), Korea (8.9; 5.6), Spain (0.2; 0.6), United Kingdom (1.3; 
6.6), United States (42.5; 25.0) 
Morocco Belgium (7.7; 9.5), Canada (2.4; 3.6), France (19.2; 25.3), Germany 
(16.1; 7.0), Netherlands (27.5; 5.0), Spain (20.1; 46.1), United States 
(6.9; 3.4) 
Source: Own elaboration on SOPEMI data 
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Table A2. Human capital, macro, community and return migration variables 
Variables 
 
Description Source Level of 
aggregation 
    
Months of employment  Sum of months spent in regular 
employment up to year t since 1985 for 
natives and since entrance in the Italian 
labour market for foreign nationals 
WHIP Individual 
Months out of employment Sum of months spent out of regular 
employment up to year t since first 
employment spell observed 
WHIP Individual 
Log VA Logarithm of value added in t ISTAT 
national 
accounts 
Branch and 
Region 
Reg. unemployment rate Regional unemployment rate in t ISTAT Labour 
force survey 
Region 
Share of reg. foreign employment Share of foreign employment of the 
individual’s same country of origin on total 
regional employment in year t 
WHIP Country of 
origin and 
Region 
Growth rate of real GDP growth rate of Real GDP per capita 
(Constant Prices: Chain series) 
Penn Word 
Tables 
Country 
Years of stay Number of years of presence in Italy since 
entrance 
WHIP Individual 
Age at entry  Age of foreign national when entering legal 
employment  
WHIP Individual 
Note. Countries included: Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Cote d`Ivoire, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Lebanon, 
Libya, Macedonia, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Somalia, Sri 
Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay 
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B. Tables and Figures 
Figure 1. Stock of resident permits for foreign nationals by main areas of origin 
 
Source: ISTAT 
Figure 2. 
Share of native immigrants and foreign nationals in total area employment by origin areas 
A. Destination NW 
 
B. Destination NE 
 
C. Destination CENTRE 
 
D. Destination SOUTH 
 
Source: WHIP and INPS data, own calculations 
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Figure 3. Average nominal weekly wage by groups - Male 18-45 
 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
Figure 4. Experience- log wage profiles for foreign nationals, native immigrants and locals, blue 
collar males in manufacturing in the North West entering in the labour market at age 16 
 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
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Figure 5. Experience- log wage profiles for foreign nationals, native immigrants and locals, blue 
collar males in manufacturing in North West entering in the labour market at age 16 in 1991 
and 1992 
 
 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
Figure 6. Experience- log wage profiles for foreign nationals, and locals, blue collar males in 
manufacturing in North West entering in the labour market at age 16 by type of jobs 
 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
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Figure 7. Experience- log wage profiles for foreign nationals and native immigrants, blue collars 
males in manufacturing in north west entering in the labour market at age 16 by type of jobs 
 
 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 1990-2003 for foreign immigrants, native immigrants and locals 
 Foreign immigrants Native immigrants Locals 
Variable Mean (Std. Err.) Mean (Std. Err.) Mean (Std. Err.) 
       
Weekly wage 290.9 (119.6) 358.2 (202.2) 329.5 (182.4) 
Age 31.79 (6.1)  31.79 (6.0) 30.85 (6.1) 
Age at entrance 27.93 (5.5) 23.75 (4.4) 22.79 (4.1) 
Months of employment 42.88 (38.4) 85.14 (57.4) 90.01 (58.4) 
Months out of employment 10.27 (19.2) 19.65 (31.6) 15.13 (26.9) 
Blue collar 0.93 (0.3) 0.68 (0.5) 0.64 (0.5) 
White collar 0.03 (0.2) 0.30 (0.5) 0.32 (0.5) 
Apprentices 0.03 (0.2) 0.02 (0.1) 0.04 (0.2) 
Atypical 0.14 (0.3) 0.11 (0.3) 0.11 (0.3) 
Firm size 0_20 0.58 (0.5) 0.40 (0.5) 0.45 (0.5) 
Firm size 20_200 0.30 (0.5) 0.29 (0.5) 0.28 (0.4) 
Firm size 200_1000 0.08 (0.3) 0.15 (0.4) 0.12 (0.3) 
Firm size _over1000 0.05 (0.2) 0.17 (0.4) 0.14 (0.3) 
North West 0.39 (0.5) 0.48 (0.5) 0.31 (0.5) 
North East 0.37 (0.5) 0.25 (0.4) 0.23 (0.4) 
Centre 0.18 (0.4) 0.21 (0.4) 0.19 (0.4) 
South 0.05 (0.2) 0.06 (0.2) 0.28 (0.4) 
Manufacturing 0.52 (0.5) 0.47 (0.5) 0.50 (0.5) 
Construction 0.21 (0.4) 0.16 (0.4) 0.13 (0.3) 
Services 0.27 (0.4) 0.38 (0.5) 0.38 (0.5) 
Mediterranean Africa 
Of which Moroccan 
0.26 
0.14 
(0.4) 
 
    
Africa other 
Of which Senegalese 
0.25 
0.22 
(0.4) 
 
    
Latin America 0.03 (0.2)     
Asia 0.17 (0.4)     
East Europe 
Of which Albanian 
0.29 
0.17 
(0.5) 
 
    
Avg. community size by region  0.63% (0.6%) 2.4% (1.6%)   
N. observations 44447  62484  371481  
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
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Table 2. Results of a duration model on the probability of leaving the WHIP dataset 
 Hazard Ratio 
Foreign immigrants 1.5129 *** 
 (0.0384)  
Native immigrants 1.0256  
 (0.0173)  
Locals benchmark 
   
N. obs 78157  
Log likelihood -45419.11  
Chi2 49959.44  
Prob>chi2 0   
Dependent variable: Presence in the WHIP dataset in years. 
Further covariates: age, age^2, weekly wage, occupation, tenure, firm size, sector, year of entry. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; 
*** at the 0.01 level. 
Source: WHIP, own calculations 
Table 3. Results of the selection equation 
  (i) (ii) 
  
Probit Random 
Effect model 
Weibull Hazard Rate 
model 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio 
Growth rate of Real GDP p.c. in origin country 0.0093 *** 1.1084 *** 
 (0.0022)  (0.0104)  
Growth rate of Real GDP p.c. in destination country 0.0446 *** 1.1251 *** 
 (0.0079)  (0.0140)  
Months of employment 0.0103 ***   
 (0.0015)    
Months of employment ^2 -0.00004 ***   
 (0.00001)    
Age at entry   1.0227 *** 
   (0.0035)  
p (shape parameter)   1.6658   
   (0.0243)  
1/p   0.6003   
   (0.0088)  
Predicted hazard rate (std. dev.)   0.2529  
   (0.4282)  
N. obs 36663  8439  
Log likelihood -12579.15  -3182.37  
Chi2 3700.22  4420.36  
Prob>chi2 0   0   
Dependent variable: probability of leaving (i) and duration of staying in years (ii) 
(i) Includes in addition all variables in wage equation (see table 3).  
(ii) Further controls: year of entrance, firm size, sector and region dummies 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; 
*** at the 0.01 level. 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
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Table 4. Fixed effect estimates of log weekly wage in nominal terms, males aged 18-45 
  Foreign immigrants Foreign immigrants Native immigrants Locals 
 (i) Correction= (ii) Correction=     
  Inv. Mills Ratio Hazard .Rate         
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept 4.1203 *** 4.4905 *** 4.4935 *** 4.5044 *** 
 (0.2282)  (0.2268)  (0.128)  (0.034)  
Age 0.0287 *** 0.0302 *** 0.0421 *** 0.0527 *** 
 (0.0090)  (0.0089)  (0.008)  (0.003)  
Age ^2 -0.0002 *** -0.0002 * -0.0002 *** -0.0003 *** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.00004)  (0.00001)  
Months of employment 0.0026 *** 0.0022 *** 0.0032 *** 0.0022 *** 
 (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0006)  (0.0003)  
Months of employment ^2 -0.000005 *** -0.000004 *** -0.000009 *** -0.000007 *** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Months out of employment 0.0011  0.0008   -0.0004  -0.0006 ** 
 (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0006)  (0.0003)  
Log Value Added 0.1587 *** 0.0810 *** 0.0616 *** 0.0752 *** 
 (0.0285)  (0.0209)  (0.011)  (0.004)  
Regional unemployment rate -0.0011  -0.0011   -0.0007  -0.0022 *** 
 (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.001)  (0.000)  
Share of regional foreign employm. -6.0484 *** -2.9723 ** -1.6862 ***   
 (1.5805)  (1.5191)  (0.577)    
Share of regional foreign empl. ^2 1.5879 ** 0.5891  0.0953    
 (0.5408)  (0.5307)  (0.063)    
Correction for return migration 0.0291 *** 0.0026 ***     
 (0.0066)  (0.0008)      
N obs 27,933  27,933  60,678  359,527  
F 139.95  138.75  701.73  7193.68  
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.4546  -0.4307  -0.2465  -0.3909  
Prob > F      = 0  0  0  0  
R-sq: within = 0.3631  0.3626  0.5261  0.604  
between = 0.0703  0.0719  0.1988  0.1751  
overall = 0.1468   0.1505   0.2720   0.2665   
Dependent variable: log weekly wage.  
Further controls: type of contract, firm size, sector and region dummies. Robust Standard errors in 
parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the 0.01 level. 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
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Table 5. Log wage profiles with increasing experience in the labour market.  
Entrants in 1991 and 1992 
 Foreign nationals Native immigrants Locals 
 MEAN (Std. err.) MEAN (Std. err.) MEAN (Std. err.) 
Average N obs  3554  4878  27083  
Weekly wage in euros at entrance 213.5 (68.5) 253.4 (121.2) 226.9 (100.2) 
Average weekly wage in euros in the 1991-
2003 period 276.2 (102.6) 351.4 (185.2) 322.0 (154.3) 
Age at entrance 28.8 (5.8) 27.6 (7.1) 25.4 (6.6) 
Average number of months of employment 
in the 1991-2003 period 54.0 (42.4) 56.5 (43.0) 61.0 (46.2) 
Average number of months out of 
employment in the 1991-2003 period 14.0 (21.2) 21.1 (28.3) 16.0 (24.7) 
       
% Morocco 17.3      
% Senegal 25.9      
% Albania 3.8      
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
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Table 6. Fixed effect estimates of log weekly wage in nominal terms for males aged 18-45, 
entrants in 1991 and 1992 
 Foreign nationals Native immigrants Locals 
       
Intercept 4.821 *** 4.509 *** 4.786 *** 
 (0.1679)  (0.3300)  (0.1277)  
Age 0.044 *** 0.063 *** 0.066 *** 
 (0.0057)  (0.0050)  (0.0017)  
Age ^2 -0.0005 *** -0.0004 ** -0.0003 *** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
Months of employment 0.0009 ** 0.0016 *** 0.0012 *** 
 (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0001)  
Months of employment ^2 0.00000   -0.00001 *** -0.00001 *** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Months out of employment 0.00000  -0.002 *** -0.001 *** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0006)  (0.0002)  
Log VA 0.061 *** 0.146 *** 0.053 *** 
 (0.0186)  (0.0361)  (0.0140)  
Regional unemployment rate 0.000  -0.122  -0.003 *** 
 (0.0038)  (0.0855)  (0.0009)  
Share of regional foreign employm. -3.089 ** 0.495     
 (1.3174)  (1.1834)    
Corr. for return migr. (Hazard Rate) 0.011 **     
 (0.0051)      
N obs 3554  4878  27083  
F 78.26  34.33  507.59  
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.3933  -0.1954  -0.3438  
Prob > F      = 0  0  0  
R-sq: within = 0.4407  0.5222  0.589  
between = 0.1219  0.1498  0.2466  
overall = 0.2233   0.2484   0.3603   
Dependent variable: log weekly wage.  
Further controls: type of contract, firm size, sector and region dummies. Robust Standard errors in parentheses. * 
Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the 0.01 level. 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
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Table 7. Average wage by sectors. Average 1990-2003 
 Foreign immigrants Locals  
 
Wage  
(std. err) 
Share of 
employment 
Wage  
(std. err) 
Share of 
employment 
% of 
foreign 
nationals 
on total 
employmen
t 
Sectors with high 
incidence of foreign 
employment (immigrants’ 
jobs) 
275.9
4 (82.9) 
0.72 
287.40 
(99.6) 
0.39 22.5% 
Others 
303.1
0 (129.0) 
0.28 
371.83 
(174.7) 
0.61 5.4% 
Note:  
Immigrants’ jobs are defined on the basis of the NACE 1970 3-digit definitions of sectors and 
include: Construction of flats, office blocks, hospitals and other buildings, both residential and 
non-residential; Hotels and catering, Manufacture of structural metal products; Building 
completion work; Processing of plastics; Secondary transformation, treatment and coating of 
metals; Travel agents, freight brokers and other agents facilitating the transport of passengers or 
goods; storage and warehousing; Tanning and dressing of leather; Foundries; Manufacture of 
mass-produced footwear; Manufacture of ready-made clothing and accessories; Working of stone 
and of non-metallic mineral products; Manufacture of concrete, cement or plaster products for 
constructional purposes; Manufacture of rubber products; Manufacture of ceramic goods; 
Slaughtering, preparing and preserving of meat; Textile finishing; Manufacture of products from 
leather and leather substitutes; Forging; drop forging, closed die-forging, pressing and stamping; 
Miscellaneous textile industries; Knitting industry; Manufacture of agricultural machinery and 
tractors; Cleaning services; Manufacture of household textiles and other made-up textile goods; 
Sawing and processing of wood; Manufacture of clay products for constructional purposes; 
Manufacture of wooden containers; Dealing in scrap and waste materials; Bespoke tailoring, 
dressmaking and hatmaking; Manufacture of articles of cork and articles of straw and other 
plaiting materials; manufacture of brushes and brooms; Preparation, spinning and weaving of flax, 
hemp and ramie; Production of hand-made footwear; Silk industry; Other wood manufactures 
(except furniture); Laundries, dyers and cleaners and similar services; Processing and preserving 
of fruit and vegetables; Civil engineering: construction of roads, bridges, railways, etc.; 
Recreational services and other cultural services; Other metal workshops not elsewhere specified; 
Boilermaking, manufacture of reservoirs, tanks and other sheet-metal containers; Manufacture of 
tools and finished metal goods, except electrical equipment; Supporting services to transport; 
Cotton industry; Manufacture of carpentry and joinery components and of parquet flooring. 
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Table 8.a. 
Fixed effect estimates of log weekly wage in nominal terms for males aged 18-45, by sectors 
 
Foreign nationals in  
Immigrants’ jobs 
Locals always  
in Immigrants jobs 
Locals starting  
in Imm. Jobs 
& then moving 
Locals never 
in Immigrants 
jobs 
         
Intercept 4.4834 *** 4.443 *** 4.4704 *** 4.5036 *** 
 (0.2391)  (0.0863)  (0.0811)  (0.0408)  
Age 0.0463 *** 0.0473 *** 0.0539 *** 0.0454 *** 
 (0.0033)  (0.0017)  (0.0024)  (0.0012)  
Age ^2 -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0006 *** -0.0002 *** 
 (0.00008)  (0.00003)  (0.00005)  (0.00002)  
Months of employment 0.0007 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0024 *** 0.0029 *** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)  
Months of employment ^2 0.00000  0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** -0.00001 *** 
 (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  
Months out of employment 0.0004  -0.0002 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0001 *** 
 (0.00065)  (0.00003)  (0.00004)  (0.00002)  
Corr. for return migr.  0.0018 **       
 (0.00104)        
N obs 16101  68101  39517  251909  
F 87.01 *** 1243.14 *** 786.55 *** 6196.87 *** 
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.5959  -0.4578  -0.3973  -0.2875  
Prob > F      = 0  0  0  0  
R-sq: within = 0.3243  0.5115  0.5604  0.6377  
between = 0.022  0.0447  0.1172  0.3365  
overall = 0.0671  0.1552  0.2824  0.4017  
Dependent variable: log weekly wage.  
Further controls: type of contract, firm size, sector and region dummies. Robust Standard errors in 
parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the 0.01 level. 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
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Table 8.b. 
Fixed effect estimates of log weekly wage in nominal terms for males aged 18-45, by sectors 
 
 
Foreign nationals in  
Immigrants’ jobs 
Native 
immigrants 
always  
in Immigrants 
jobs 
Native 
immigrants 
starting  
in Imm. Jobs & 
then moving 
Native 
immigrants never 
in Immigrants 
jobs 
         
Intercept 4.4834 *** 4.440 *** 4.480 *** 4.522 *** 
 (0.2391)  (0.2266)  (0.2086)  (0.1201)  
Age 0.0463 *** 0.0542 *** 0.0349 *** 0.0423 *** 
 (0.0033)  (0.0044)  (0.0060)  (0.0038)  
Age ^2 -0.0003 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.00009 *** 
 (0.00008)  (0.00008)  (0.0004)  (0.00006)  
Months of employment 0.0007 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0039 *** 0.0036 *** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0004)  (0.0005)  (0.0003)  
Months of employment 
^2 0.00000  0.00000 
*** 
0.00000 
*** 
-0.00001 
*** 
 (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  
Months out of 
employment 0.0004  -0.0004 
*** 
-0.0002 
* 
-0.0001 
 
 (0.00065)  (0.00008)  (0.0001)  (0.00005)  
Corr. for return migr.  0.0018 **       
 (0.00104)        
N obs 16101  15912  7523  37243  
F 87.01 *** 21608.7 *** 118.15 *** 594.58 *** 
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.5959  -0.4971  -0.3512  -0.2707  
Prob > F      = 0  0  0  0  
R-sq: within = 0.3243  0.4398  0.517  0.5745  
between = 0.022  0.04  0.1263  0.238  
overall = 0.0671  0.1204  0.305  0.2821  
Dependent variable: log weekly wage.  
Further controls: type of contract, firm size, sector and region dummies. Robust Standard errors in 
parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the 0.01 level. 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
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